When Donald Trump was elected president in 2016, many observers noted that, terrifyingly, he would soon be the sole person in charge of determining whether or not to use the U.S.’s vast nuclear weapons capability. He would have the ability to end all life on Earth within minutes.
As Barack Obama and Joe Biden were preparing to hand the nuclear codes over, the outgoing vice president warned against any preemptive use of the terrible weapons: “Given our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of today’s threats — it’s hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary,” Biden saidJanuary 2017. Biden added that he and Obama had “made a commitment to create the conditions by which the sole purpose of nuclear weapons would be to deter others from launching a nuclear attack.”
Despite Biden’s encouraging remarks that the United States likely wouldn’t employ the “first use” of nuclear weapons, Trump was inheriting a nuclear weapons apparatus with far more continuity than rupture from previous administrations. The United States had not, in fact, adopted an explicit “no first use” policy during the Obama administration, despite relentless lobbying from nonproliferation experts. Trump took over the U.S. nuclear powers and authorities, just as he did with many other aspects of the U.S. security state, and expanded them to enrich weapons contractors, and fulfill the reactionary requirement to maintain U.S. military hegemony.
Four U.S. presidents published reports known as a Nuclear Posture Review, (NPR), which date back to 1993 when the Clinton White House was established. The Trump administration’s NPR was typically bellicose. Contrary to Biden’s urging in 2017 that the “sole use” of nuclear weapons should be in response to a nuclear attack, Trump’s review significantly widened the aperture for their use. This report, whose author is still unknown, referenced using nuclear weapons to deter “non-nuclear aggression,” a phrase widely understood at the time to include cyber, chemical and biological attacks.
President Joe Biden’s administration is now in the final stages of completing his own Nuclear Posture Review, scheduled to be finished early this year. The signs are not encouraging for nonproliferation experts or anti-nuclear warfare activists. Leonor Tomero was appointed by Biden to oversee the review in September. forcedHer job was described as a bureaucratic organization, but was widely believed to be a power grab of the national security government. Tomero was employed by the National Security State before her sacking. trying to bring official U.S. nuclear policy in line with Biden’s previously stated “sole purpose” philosophy. Biden’s National Security Council had previously issued two documents to provide guidance on the White House’s nuclear priorities, neither of which adopted a “sole purpose” policy.
Even more worrying was Biden’s first defense budget, which signaled the administration would continue Trump’s two new nuclear weapons programs: a sea-launched ballistic missile and the creation of low-yield nuclear warheads. Nonproliferation activists have rumoured that the administration might end up scrapping these programs once it releases its review. But the sense among expertsThese programs are low-hanging fruits. Despite the fact that 55 Democratic members are in Congress, it is not likely that nuclear weapons will be less reliant on them. calling on Biden to adopt a “no first use” policy and to stop the deployment of Trump’s two new nuclear weapons systems.
Joseph Cirincione, a fellow at the Quincy Institute and longtime nonproliferation expert, offered a blistering assessment of the Biden nuclear policy so far: “It is not a rational response to external threats but is driven primarily by domestic factors including a hubristic strategy of nuclear supremacy, partisan politics, and entrenched arms lobbies with formidable influence in the Pentagon and Congress,” Cirincione wroteThis was earlier in the month.
Part of the U.S. nuclear posture is called a declaratory formulation — that is, a public statement signaling both to allies and adversaries when the government might use nuclear weapons. Ever since President Truman became the first and only head of state to drop a nuclear bomb — two, in his case — the U.S. declaratory position has been deliberately ambiguous. Hawks believe that strategic ambiguity keeps potential adversaries on their toes and provides comfort for allies such as Japan, who rely on U.S. nukes deterrent capability. Nonproliferation and peace activists argue against strategic ambiguity, which is counterproductive in lowering nuclear war’s likelihood.
Although Biden is not expected to adopt a “no first use” or “sole purpose” standard in his forthcoming NPR, the benefits of doing so could be enormous. “Announcing that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies and partners […] would clearly signal a policy course change and renewed U.S. global leadership toward reduced reliance on nuclear weapons,” writesSteve Andreasen from the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
China is the only country that can do this. country that has a clear, caveat-free “no first use” policy, which the country initially declared in 1964 and has since repeatedly publicly reaffirmed.
Biden’s administration runs the risk of moving in the opposite direction. “Instead of sole purpose, the Pentagon bureaucracy wants Biden to go back 12 years to Obama’s 2010 review and adopt weak language that would allow the use of nuclear weapons in multiple scenarios, including cyberattacks,” warnsTom Collina, policy director at Ploughshares Fond, a nonproliferation organisation.
The simmering conflict at the Ukraine-Russia border is almost certain to be putting pressure on Biden to adopt a more hawkish Cold War-era stance towards nuclear weapons. Ironically, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is exactly the kind of situation that exposes the absurdity of even the implied threat of nuclear arms. There is substantial risk that either the U.S. or Russia could misinterpret the others’ moves, resulting in escalatory tit-for-tat retaliation that would be disastrous with conventional weapons, but truly catastrophic with nuclear weapons.
Yet, too many national security officials and associated think tanks still believe that a nuclear war is possible. can be won. The Pentagon and its private sector partners have a massive financial incentive not only to retain the U.S.’s current posture, but to increase the nation’s reliance on nuclear weapons. If he wanted to, Biden could change this. Whether he’ll listen to his own words from 2017 remains to be seen.
